This monograph is an account of the operations of armored units of the United States Army in the Republic of Vietnam. The term armored units as used here is generic and includes lank and mechanized infantry battalions and companies, armored cavalry squadrons and troops, and air cavalry squadrons and troops-all forces whose primary modus operandi was to fight mounted. Of necessity the story begins not with the arrival of the first U.S. armored units in Vietnam in 1965 but with armor’ in Vietnam during the years immediately after World War II. The generally unsuccessful experience of French armored forces in Southeast Asia from the end of World War II to 1954 convinced American military men that armored units could not be employed in Vietnam. It was widely believed that Vietnam’s monsoon climate together with its jungle and rice paddies constituted an environment too hostile for mechanized equipment. It was further agreed that armored forces could not cope with an elusive enemy that operated from jungle ambush. Thus, at the outset of American participation in the conflict and for some time thereafter, Army planners saw little or no need for armored units in the U.S. force structure in Vietnam. At the same time, however, extensive American aid that flowed into Vietnam after the French left the country was directed in part to developing all armored force for the newly created Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
262 pages
